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Introduction
It is a truism that in a world with increasingly integrated national economies, monetary policy in each country affects economic welfare both at home and abroad. Due to the presence of beggar-thy-neighbor and beggar-thyself effects, however, the welfare effects are difficult to sign. The exploration of the international spillovers and the design of an optimal monetary policy in closed and open economies has become a cottage industry for that reason (see, e.g., Corsetti and Pesenti, 2001a,b; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2002; Devereux and Engel, 2003; Sutherland, 2004) . Given that wages and/or prices are predetermined, the core of the problem is a simple trade-off: monetary policy is useful for closing the output gap arising from monopolistic competition but may have an adverse terms-of-trade effect. The purpose of this paper is to ask whether monetary policy is beggar-thy-neighbor or beggar-thyself and to compare non-cooperative and cooperative optimal monetary policies.
To address the issues of interest, we set up a non-stochastic two-country general equilibrium model with imperfect competition on goods and labor markets and nominal wage and price rigidities. Some firms segment markets by country, they can charge different prices in domestic and foreign markets. In a similar framework Betts and Devereux (2000a,b) have shown that the sign of the terms-of-trade effect very much depends on the pricing policy of firms. If firms pre-set their export prices in the currency of the producer (consumer), the terms of trade of the expanding country will worsen (improve). In their model, the fraction of exporters who set prices in local currency of sale (pricing to market PTM) is symmetric across countries. Our framework instead allows the fraction of PTM firms to differ across the home and the foreign country, so that any change in the terms of trade can be separated in a change in export prices depending on home PTM and a change in import prices depending on PTM abroad. This distinction is crucial, since the increase in world aggregate demand is a function of the difference of the degrees of PTM, and since a given movement of the terms of trade is now compatible with various consumption and output (employment) allocations. 1 Optimal policies are derived using as objective criterion welfare of the representative agent defined over the discounted flow of consumption, the utility of real balances and the disutility of work effort. Somewhat surprisingly, this most natural criterion is not very common in the related literature, where many contributions assume away the real balance term (see, e.g., Corsetti and Pesenti, 2001b; Sutherland, 2004) . If, however, real balances are important for determining allocations of agents and monetary authorities are maximizing the welfare of agents then it should be included in the policymakers' problem. But this comes at a price. To get an exact solution for the welfare term we have to choose specific functional forms. In particular, utility is logarithmic in consumption and the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is restricted to unity. The latter precludes current account imbalances and thus shuts off any long-run effects of money. But since the unitary value is within the range of empirical estimates of this parameter and no approximations of welfare are needed in order to characterize the optimal policy functions, the gain of this assumption, at least from our point of view, outweigh the costs in form of a loss in generality. The country which exhibits a higher degree of PTM than its neighbor will come up with a higher (or at least the same) welfare level. (v) If there is no terms-of-trade effect at the aggregate level, the Nash optimal monetary stance is identical for both countries; it does not matter which country experiences a higher degree of PTM in its economy. (vi) There is always a welfare gain from cooperation independently of the degrees of PTM.
The superiority of cooperation contrasts to parts of the literature. Assuming a world of no PTM Rogoff (1985) finds that the worsening of the terms of trade puts a brake on the policymakers' incentive to inflate in order to fill the output gap. Cooperation removes this brake, so that the equilibrium inflation rate rises implying a decline in welfare compared to the case of policy competition. Our result is different since we leave wages and prices as predetermined, not forward looking variables. We consider policies under commitment, which are not, in general, time-consistent in the Barro-Gordon sense. Betts and Devereux (2000a) find that the degree of PTM determines whether cooperation is good or bad. This result, however, hinges on an arbitrary assumed cost of inflation, which is absent in the welfare of private agents but part of the objective function of the policymaker.
3 Corsetti and Pesenti (2001b) analyze a stochastic two-country model and show that there are gains from cooperation when the degrees of PTM are strictly between zero and unity. In the polar cases of no and full PTM the movement in the terms of trade has no impact on relative consumption and output, there is no incentive to use the terms of trade strategically and thus no gain from cooperation (see also Benigno and Benigno, 2003, and Engel, 2003) . Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) argue that even in the case where there are some gains from cooperation, these are likely to be very small. Benigno (2002) , on the other hand, shows that these gains will be non-trivial if utility is not logarithmic in consumption. Sutherland (2004) makes a similar point emphasizing the case where the cross-country elasticity exceeds unity (for a discussion of the importance of this parameter for the sign of the welfare spill-over see also Tille, 2001, and Michaelis, 2004) . Pappa (2002) provides a most general model and discusses how sensitive welfare responds to changes in key parameters like the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the labor supply elasticity, the degree of openness etc.
The paper is structured as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. Section 3 presents the solution of the model and a discussion of the transmission mechanism of monetary shocks. Section 4 discusses the design of an optimal monetary policy distinguishing between a world Nash equilibrium and a cooperative equilibrium. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
We consider a world of two countries of identical size, Home and Foreign, each populated by a continuum of identical households with population size normalized to unity and each specialized in the production of one type of goods. The national types of goods consists of a number of brands defined over a continuum of unit mass. Each brand, indexed by i, is produced by a single firm and sold world-wide. Home firms produce brands on the interval , whereas Foreign firms produce brands on the interval .
Following Betts and Devereux (2000a,b) , we assume that a fraction of firms in each country can segment their markets by country, i.e., they can charge different prices for their pricing-to-market (PTM) goods in domestic and foreign markets. Before the exchange rate is known these firms set prices in the currency of the buyer. For the remaining firms the law of one price (LOP) holds. Prices for their LOP goods are assumed to be set in the currency of the seller. We extend the Betts/Devereux-scenario by allowing for asymmetries between countries with respect to the degree of PTM. The fraction of PTM-firms in the Home country, s, need not be equal to that in the Foreign country, . 
Households
A representative Home household 5 maximizes its lifetime utility
where are nominal balances, is Home's consumer price index, are total hours worked by the household, ß is the discount factor, and is a consumption index defined as
Here, and are the consumption baskets of Home and Foreign goods, respectively.
The parameter α is the share of the Home good in the overall consumption basket. Due to the Cobb-Douglas specification of (2), the elasticity of substitution between the two available types of goods is restricted to unity. This assumption allows for a closed-form solution, but of course the tractability comes at the price of generality. In particular, because of a unitary terms-of-trade elasticity of exports and imports this assumption shuts off any current account imbalances and thus any long-run effects of monetary policies. Empirically, however, the assumption of unit elasticity seems warranted.
Moreover, the model is restricted to a unitary intertemporal elasticity of substitution and a marginal disutility of labor equal to two. For the implications of these parameters for the welfare effects of monetary policy see Pappa (2002) .
In Eq. (2), and are CES aggregates across Home and Foreign brands,
where , and denote consumption of the Home variety , consumption of the Foreign PTM variety and consumption of the Foreign LOP variety , respectively. The parameter
represents the elasticity of substitution between any two goods produced in the same country.
The lifetime utility of Foreign households is analogously defined. In particular, Home and Foreign households are assumed to have identical discount factors and identical preferences towards liquidity services and labor. However, we take into account the growing evidence of a significant degree of home bias in international trade (see Mc Callum, 1995; Engel and Rogers, 1996) by assuming that both Home and Foreign households have an equal bias for their own domestically produced good. This approach follows Warnock (2003) . The consumption index of a Foreign household is given by The consumption-based price index, defined as the minimal expenditure required to purchase one unit of consumption , is given by
where
In equation (5) 
where are bond holdings by Foreign households.
Home and Foreign households make consumption decisions, choose nominal balances and set a nominal wage so as to maximize lifetime utility subject to their budget constraint.
The solutions to these maximization problems are: 
Equations (11) Equations (14) are the optimal labor supply decisions. It is assumed that each household is monopolistic supplier of a specific type of labor and that all Home (Foreign) firms hire all Home (Foreign) types of labor. Given the negatively-sloped labor demand schedule for its type of labor, each household chooses the utility maximizing point on the labor demand curve. As (14) indicates, the optimal real wage is a mark-up, , on the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. The parameter 
etc., Eqs. (13) give the aggregate consumption demand for each type of goods.
Firms
Production of the Home (Foreign) good requires a continuum of differentiated labor inputs which are monopolistically supplied by Home (Foreign) households. The technology is given by and
, where j and indexes Home and Foreign households, respectively. In a symmetric equilibrium, output turns out to be linear in labor:
Prices are set in advance and cannot be adjusted to a monetary shock within the period. Firms set prices at a level so as to achieve the optimal mark-up in the absence of such a shock. Let us have a look at Home PTM firms. Since they can segment markets, they have two parameters to maximize profits, and . Profits are given by )
Focusing on a symmetric equilibrium, the optimal price charged by Home PTM firms to Home residents is a constant mark-up, 1 − κ , over marginal costs:
The parameter
serves as an index for product-market competitiveness. The price charged to Foreign residents, , will be set so that its expected Home currency value is a fixed mark-up over marginal costs too. Provided that the price elasticities of demand are the same in each country, the optimal mark-ups will be the same, so that even PTM firms do not price-discriminate across countries. Once prices are set, firms are ready to meet product demand. If there is an unexpected depreciation (appreciation) of the Home currency, profits of Home PTM firms will adjust, i.e. Home exporters of PTM goods get a higher (lower) revenue in domestic currency. It is straightforward to show that the optimal pricing of Home LOP firms also yields given by (16). Foreign firms' optimal prices can be derived (and interpreted) in a similar way. 
The left-hand side of (17) is period t expenditure for consumption and bonds, the right-hand side is income arising from product demand, repaid loans and interest payments. Foreign's current account is analogously defined.
The Solution of the Model
Our focus will be on the impact of permanent unanticipated changes in Home and Foreign money supply. We distinguish between three periods. In the initial period, the economy is in a steady state. In period t, the monetary shocks occur and we observe the shortrun equilibrium which assumes that nominal wages are fixed before the shocks can be observed. In the long run (from period 1 + t onward), nominal wages adjust and all variables reach their new steady-state values. To save notation, we hereafter drop time indexes.
Variables in the initial equilibrium are denoted by a zero subscript, variables in the new longrun equilibrium are indexed by an upperbar, short-run variables are not indexed.
The Initial Steady State
In the initial steady state all markets clear in each country. To get a closed-form solution for the aggregate variables, one needs the assumption of zero net foreign assets. For
, it is straightforward to show that the steady-state levels of output, employment and consumption in Home and Foreign are given by
and that the equilibrium value for the nominal exchange rate is . The initial steady state is a flexible-price equilibrium, where money is neutral. The less competitive the labor and goods markets (low
, the higher are the price mark-ups and the lower are labor and product demand and hence aggregate output, employment and consumption. Note that the social optimum is characterized by perfect labor and goods markets ) 1 , ( → ψ κ , where goods prices are equal to marginal costs and where the real wage is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure.
The Short-run and the Long-run Equilibrium
In period t a once-and-for-all unanticipated change in Home and/or Foreign money supply occurs. In the case of a monetary expansion we have
. For convenience and without loss of generality, we normalize the initial money supply in Home and Foreign to unity: . 1 Table 1 about here   Table 1 presents the general solution of the model. Because of the absence of current account imbalances, money is neutral in the long run. All real variables, i.e., consumption, output, employment and real money supply return to their pre-shock level (see (24) and (25)).
Turning to the short-run equilibrium, Eq. (26) shows that the nominal exchange rate depreciates in proportion to the rise in relative Home money supply and instantaneously jumps to its new steady-state level. There is no short-run over-or undershooting, since due to our specification of the utility function (1) both the interest rate elasticity and the consumption elasticity of money demand are equal to unity.
Equations (27) 
The net effect on Home's terms of trade is given by Eq. (28). When , the terms of trade worsen, the increase in the Home currency export prices does not offset the increase in Home import prices. For , the terms of trade improve, and for , the change in export prices equals the rise in import prices, so that the terms of trade do not move.
Eq. (28) replicates an important result already obtained by Betts and Devereux (2000a,b) and extends its application to the case of country specific degrees of PTM: the sign of the terms- , and the larger the fraction of Foreign PTM firms, , the smaller is the increase in P (see Eq. (29)). Put different, the degree of Home price stickiness is increasing in the degree of Foreign PTM. In the case of full Foreign PTM, , the import prices and thus the consumer price index does not change at all (remember that is assumed to be fix). Analogously, the depreciation of the Home currency constitutes a deflationary bias in Foreign, which is maximized at . As Home's degree of PTM, s, gets larger, the fraction of firms lowering their prices in Foreign currency and thus the decrease in The increase in real balances in both Home and Foreign generates a boost in product demand. Since world product demand (world consumption) moves in proportion to world real money supply, the size of the demand shock very much depends on the pricing policy of firms. Defining the world real money supply, , as geometric average of Home and Foreign real money supply, using 1/2 as weights, we get from (23):
The (20)). As a result, the impact of a Home monetary expansion on overall Foreign consumption is decreasing in s, whereas does not matter (see (21)).
Short-run output and employment in the Home economy unambiguously boost because of higher Home demand for domestic goods and higher exports to Foreign. As just described, the latter are falling in s, so that the impact of a Home monetary innovation on domestic output and employment is decreasing in Home PTM (see (22)). Similarly, by pushing up Home demand for Foreign goods, the monetary expansion at Home increases Foreign output and employment, with the only exception of no Foreign PTM where the increase in import prices leaves no room for an increase in real demand for Foreign goods (see (22)).
Welfare-maximizing monetary policy
In this section we ask for the design of an optimal monetary policy. Due to the distortions in the labor and the goods markets and due to terms-of-trade effects a surprise monetary expansion may raise welfare in the country where it takes place. The sign of the welfare spill-over on its neighbor(s) is a priori unknown, all three cases are possible depending on the degrees of PTM. In Section 4.1 we assume policy makers in Home and Foreign who follow a policy of maximizing welfare of domestic households, taking as given the monetary stance abroad. The solution of the two reaction functions is the world Nash equilibrium discussed in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3 we derive the implications of our model for the coordination of international monetary policies by comparing the world Nash equilibrium with the cooperative equilibrium.
Welfare Effects
The policy problem faced by Home monetary authorities is to maximize the intertemporal utility function (1), V:
where use has been made of the assumption that from period 1 + t onwards the economy is in the new steady state. We assume that the monetary authorities are able to commit to preannounced rules. For a more detailed discussion of this issue see Corsetti and Pesenti (2001b) .
Eq. (23) shows that real balances are in proportion to consumption, . Thus we can replace the term
in (33) in order to get the welfare effects of a Home monetary expansion as
Observing the expressions given in Table 1 , (34) takes the form
where the derivatives have been evaluated at the initial steady state. The properties of (35) and (36) 
(iii) If and only if Home PTM is at an intermediate range, that is if s s s < <
, welfare will raise in both countries.
Proof: (i) The multiplier is monotonically increasing in s, and the substitution of
(ii) Likewise, the multiplier is monotonically decreasing in s, and the substitution of
follows the relation s s ≤ which, given the proofs of part (i) and (ii), is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a range for s, where both countries benefit.
As indicated by (35) and (36), the overall welfare effects of a Home monetary impulse stem from two sources, namely monopolistic distortions in the goods and/or labor markets and a terms-of-trade effect . Notice that a home bias is no distortion in a welfare theoretic sense constituting an inefficiency. Concerning market imperfections, it holds that the less competitive goods and labor markets, the lower are consumption and output
in the initial steady state, and the higher is the welfare benefit of a given increase in aggregate product demand. The welfare benefit from higher consumption exceeds the disutility of more employment (less leisure). Turning to the terms-of-trade effect, we note -once again -that its sign depends on the sum of the PTM degrees. Furthermore, the terms-of-trade effect matters more in a more open economy (low home bias). For , Home observes an improvement in its terms of trade strengthening the welfare benefit stemming from higher product demand. Foreign, on the other hand, observes a worsening in its terms of trade mitigating the welfare benefit. The reverse is true for . In order to assess the empirical relevance of the critical shares s and s , it is appropriate to run a quantitative calibration exercise. We set the degree of product market and labor market distortions as to yield a labor supply, which in the initial steady state deviates from the distortion free level of employment by 7%. This number is slightly above the US-American and slightly below the unemployment rate in the Euro area. The required value is . Estimates of the Foreign degree of PTM can be derived from estimates of the degree of exchange rate pass-through into import prices, since import prices increase in the exchange rate with elasticity (see (27)). Campa and Goldberg (2002) provide such estimates across countries and report that the United States has relatively low pass through . The Euro area, approximated by a non-weighted average of Germany, France and Italy, has a medium degree of pass through , whereas Japan has high pass through . Similar results are also found by Brauer (2003) . Marston (1990) , Knetter (1993) and Brauer (2003) Bank probably generates a positive welfare externality to its neighbors. Lastly, consider the Japanese case. Assuming a PTM of about 60 percent for Japanese exporters, which is in line with the studies by Marston (1990) , Parsley (1993) and Gagnon and Knetter (1995) 7 , it is likely that a Japanese monetary expansion would be beggar-thyself and prosper-thy-neighbor.
In summary, our calculations suggest that a win-win situation is the rule, but for a wide range of plausible parameter constellations we will observe a beggar-thyself outcome.
World Nash Equilibrium
In this section we derive the optimal monetary stances in a world Nash equilibrium. Both 
The world Nash equilibrium is the solution of the reaction functions, Eq. (37) 
With an optimal policy in place, Home production (employment) and consumption are:
Inserting (39) and (40) into (33) gives Home welfare as
. (41) The same expressions hold for Foreign production, consumption and welfare. The properties of (39) - (41) (ii) the Nash optimal monetary policy offsets the distortions due to monopolistic product and labor markets completely.
(iii) Home and Foreign welfare are bell-shaped in the degree of PTM with a maximum at
, the Nash optimal monetary policy supports the first-best allocation (social optimum)
Proof: (i) immediately follows from the inspection of (39), (ii) follows from the absence of κ and ψ in (40). For
, we get from (41), which proofs part (iii). To proof part (iv), insert into (40).
As explained above, each country's incentive to expand its money supply is increasing in the degree of PTM. Thus, both countries optimally choose a higher money supply, the higher is s. For , each country generates a negative welfare spill-over by attempting to 2 / 1 > s improve its terms of trade at the expense of its neighbor. In a symmetric equilibrium, however, where both countries are assumed to be identical with respect to the degree of PTM, the equilibrium terms of trade are independent of the monetary stance (see (28) with
), so that there will only be a too expansive policy (inflationary bias). When 2 / 1 < s , a similar line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that the Nash optimal monetary stance will have a deflationary bias. This kind of spill-over reaches a maximum in the polar cases of no and full PTM. For 2 / 1 = s , there is no terms-of-trade effect even at the national level and hence neither a deflationary nor an inflationary bias.
In a symmetric equilibrium it is not possible to use the terms-of-trade effect strategically.
Thus, there is no trade off between the aims of closing the output gap and improving the terms of trade. This in turn opens up the possibility − and this is, of course, utility maximizing − to pursue a policy that closes the output gap completely (see Part (ii) of Proposition 2). In the case , the Nash optimal monetary stance leads to the first-best allocation because of the absence of any inflationary or deflationary bias.
Now consider the case where the PTM parameters in Home and Foreign are allowed to be different but sum up to unity:
. In this case the reaction functions (37) and (38) deliver the world Nash optimal monetary stance in Home and Foreign as 
With an optimal policy in place, Home consumption, output (employment) and welfare are: 
These results establish 
This leads to 
To gain some intuition let us start with , where we know from Eqs. (39) - (41) that
Home and Foreign are identical with respect to the optimal money supply, consumption, output and welfare. Moreover, the higher the degree of PTM, the higher consumption and output, and the lower is the marginal utility of consumption and the higher is the marginal disutility of employment. Now suppose that this equilibrium is distorted by an increase in the degree of Home PTM, s. How does such a distortion affect the first-order conditions for the optimal monetary stances in Home and Foreign? In Home, the marginal utility of a higher M remains constant (note from (21) that C does not depend on s), whereas due to lower exports to Foreign and thus due to a lower output effect the marginal disutility of a higher M goes down. As a consequence, a higher s forces (21) and (22): the economy with a higher relative money supply experiences both higher consumption and higher employment (output). In terms of welfare, we get the result that in a world Nash equilibrium, relative welfare is unambiguously determined by the degrees of PTM. A country which exhibits a higher degree of PTM than its neighbor will come up with a higher (or at least the same) welfare level.
Cooperative Equilibrium
In this section we discuss the issue of international monetary coordination: are there any welfare gains from cooperation, and if so, how are they related to the degrees of PTM?
Suppose that the two monetary authorities sign a binding contract on a cooperative policy.
Policy makers agree on a single social welfare function which they jointly maximize. Since Home and Foreign are assumed to be symmetric, it is most natural to maximize the average of the national welfare levels:
Moreover, due to the symmetry assumption, Home and Foreign exert the same influence on world welfare, so that both countries will implement the same monetary stance:
To derive the optimal cooperative policy, insert the expressions from Table 1 and maximize (46) with respect to M (or, equivalently, with respect to * M ). This delivers the optimal cooperative policy as κψ 1 ) (
In a cooperative equilibrium Home consumption, output (employment) and welfare are:
The properties of (47) - (49) When countries cooperate, they internalize the welfare spillovers. As aforementioned, for , each country generates a negative welfare spill-over by attempting to improve its terms of trade at the expense of its neighbor. But the equilibrium terms of trade are independent of the monetary stance, so that there will only be a too expansive policy (inflationary bias). When , the Nash optimal monetary stance will have a Corsetti and Pesenti (2001b) and Devereux and Engel (2003) , who argue that there will be no gain from cooperation in the cases of no and full PTM. For , there are no terms-of-trade effects and thus no welfare spill-overs. In such a case monetary coordination is of no consequence (Betts and Devereux, 2000a) .
Conclusions
The key message of our paper is that both the magnitude of the degree of pricing to market and its asymmetry between countries is decisive for the transmission mechanism and the welfare effects of monetary policy. In particular, these parameters are decisive for the question whether monetary policy is beggar-thy-neighbor or beggar-thyself. By comparing non-cooperative and cooperative optimal monetary policies we find, firstly, that there is always a gain from cooperation, and secondly, that the gain reaches a maximum at the polar cases of no and full pricing to market since in these cases the movement in the terms of trade and thus the welfare spill-over is at a maximum in the non-cooperative setting.
Our framework can be extended in several ways, for instance by a less restrictive preference specification. Most prominent is the role of the cross-country elasticity of substitution. Assuming a value different from unity would imply long-term effects of monetary policy via current-account imbalances opening up interesting interactions with various distortions like monopolistic competition on goods and labor markets or imperfections concerning the financial market structure. Further research will show whether the secondorder approximation technique put forward by Sutherland (2004) overcomes the problem of obtaining exact and explicit solutions when the cross-country elasticity of substitution differs from unity.
Another promising line of research is the joint determination of optimal fiscal and monetary policy. Steps in this direction have been taken by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b).
If policymakers were able to neutralize the monopolistic competition distortions by subsidies on wages and production, the flexible price equilibrium would be efficient, and monetary policy could be used for some other objectives. Stochastic open economy models à la Rogoff (2000, 2002) take up this idea and analyze how alternative monetary policy rules perform in mitigating demand, supply and liquidity-preference shocks. If, however, the government has no access to non-distortionary instruments, we will be back in a second-best world where the design of optimal policies will be an exciting subject of further research. Corsetti and Pesenti (2001b) take up a similar approach by allowing the degrees of PTM to differ across countries. They consider the case in which exporters pre-set prices in foreign currency but are able to modify them after observing exchange-rate changes. The pass-through elasticity is assumed to be constant and exogenous to the model. This approach, however, appears inconsistent with working from first principles. If there are no menu costs or the like impeding a price change, the profit-maximizing response to an exchange-rate change is a complete pass-through. In other words, the assumption of incomplete pass-through contradicts with the assumption of profit-maximizing firms.
2 In Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a) and Sutherland (2004) a second-order approximation of the welfare measure is derived in order to analyze the case of a cross-country elasticity different from unity.
3 For a derivation of loss functions typically assumed in the literature on monetary policy evaluation that are grounded in the welfare of private agents see Woodford (2002) . 4 The empirical literature indicates that the degree of PTM differs between both industries and countries (see for instance Marston, 1990; Goldberg and Knetter, 1997; and Campa and Goldberg, 2002) . We take the degrees of PTM as given, i.e. we do not endogenise the currency of price setting. This issue is discussed in Taylor (2000), Aizenman (2004) , and Devereux et al. (2004) .
5 Since we will focus on symmetric equilibria, where all households are identical within a country, we omit any household index and interpret all variables in both per-capita and aggregate terms. 6 The benchmark estimates are in the range [1, 2] . Many studies, see for instance Chari et al. (2000) and Smets and Wouters (2002) , set the elasticity at 1.5. More recent studies, however, suggest that the price elasticities of imports and exports have declined over time (Marquez, 1999) . According to Hooper and Marquez (1995) the median value of the estimates for Germany, the United Kingdom and Japan is 0.6. Bergin (2004) gets the result that the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is not significant different from unity. So a very plausible range for this elasticity is [0.5,1.5], and the unitary assumption falls right in the middle.
7 For a critical review of this literature see Kikuchi and Sumner (2002) . 
